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ABSTRACT 
In recent decades there has been increasing attention for Chinese economic development. 
There has been a big debate though if its growth is caused by capital accumulation 
(perspiration factors) or driven by Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth (inspiration 
factors). The difference between both stances is quite substantial since, if the perspiration 
theory is correct, one expects the growth of the Chinese economy to slow down over time as 
the capital accumulation grows increasingly less efficient. However, so far this question is 
difficult to analyse for China since we lack information on one of the factors of production, 
human capital.  
 To analyse this question, in this paper we develop a new dataset on human capital for 
the provinces of China between 1922 and 2010. Using our new dataset, together with physical 
capital and per capita GDP, allows us to do a TFP analysis for sub periods. We find a 
continuously negative TFP growth suggesting that reduction in productivity was a structural 
feature of the Chinese economy. If true, this was to lend support to the perspiration theory and 
would suggest a slowdown of the Chinese economy in the future. However, standard growth 
accounting allocates both technical efficiency of the factors of production and the general 
technical development to TFP. Subtracting technical efficiency from TFP growth, we find that 
general technological development turns increasingly positive in the 1990s and 2000s. This 
suggests that, whereas until the reform period China was largely driven by capital 
accumulation, afterwards general technical development got an increasingly prominent place 
giving hope for continued economic development in the future. 
 
JEL classification: N15, O11, P23 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, China experiences remarkable economic growth. In terms of per capita growth 
China ranked 8
th
 over-all between 2000 and 2008. At the same time, China ranked 76 in terms 
of its level of per capita GDP (Maddison, 2007). However, if we were to use the data from 
Barro and Lee (2010) on average years of education, China ranked 79
th
 over-all, among 
countries like Gabon, Iran, and Mongolia, while, according to the Extended Penn World 
Tables, China ranked 73
th
 in per capita physical capital with countries like the Dominican 
Republic, Venezuela, and Romania (Marquetti and Foley, 2011).  
 At first sight, these numbers suggest that growth in China was not excessively driven 
by factor accumulation since the level of the factors of production was not substantially more 
than average in the world economy. As a result economic growth must have been driven by a 
combination of factor accumulation and productivity (Total Factor Productivity - TFP) growth 
(perspiration and inspiration factors as dubbed by Krugman (1994)). This does not, however, 
match with much of the current literature. Using improved measures of physical capital, 
several studies found large contribution of physical capital growth to GDP per capita growth 
in China in the order of magnitude of ca. 50% on average (e.g. Chow, 1993), while TFP 
growth is found to be either small or even negative. 
 If these latter empirical results are correct, we can expect a reduction of economic 
growth in China since the fast growth of the perspiration factors cannot be sustained in the 
long-run because of diminishing returns to the factors of production (Young, 1995; Krugman, 
1997), except if inspiration (TFP growth) increases in importance over time, a stance made by 
Collins and Bosworth (1996).
1
 Some studies have indeed argued that such an increase in TFP 
growth seems to exist when looking at standard TFP analysis: Wang and Yao (2003) find that 
TFP growth increased considerably during the late 1990s while Li (2009) also reports 
relatively high levels of TFP growth.  
 However, most studies finding a relatively high TFP growth during the late 1990s 
either did not include human capital or only used average years of education as a proxy. As 
Van Leeuwen and Foldvari (2011) argue, however, using average years of education in 
growth regressions is fraught with problems, largely because it does not take account of the 
value of human capital.  Indeed, using an income based measure of human capital, Whalley 
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 Bosworth and Collins (1996: 15*) find that TFP growth contributed about 50% to over-all growth in 
every period between 1960 and 1994 in China.  
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and Zhao (2010) find a negative TFP growth for the late 1990s, even though there are 
significant differences on a provincial level. For example Li (2009: 219) estimates TFP 
growth for four main regions in China, reaching the conclusion that TFP growth was highest 
in the Eastern provinces, while Bao et al. (2002) argue that growth in the coastal provinces 
has been higher largely due to geographical factors.  
 In this paper, we combine the existing regional GDP and physical capital estimates 
with a new dataset on human capital by provinces going back to the 1920s to analyse the 
effects of the inspiration and perspiration factors of economic growth corrected for regional 
diversity. We find that including the contribution of human capital to economic growth leaves 
us with a negative growth of TFP. This result has to be further corrected for differences in 
technical efficiency, however, since the contribution of factors of production to economic 
growth may significantly differ by provinces. Neglecting these differences would lead to 
biased estimates of the change of productivity, causing it to look insignificant, or even 
negative. After correcting for provincial differences in technical efficiency, we find evidence 
for a positive rate of general technological development especially from the 1990s onwards. 
This paper has the following structure: In the next section, we outline our estimation of 
the cost-based measure of human capital, which is a slightly modified version of the measure 
suggested by Judson (2002), as well as the underlying series of average years of education 
Since technical efficiency of the factors of production may differ by province, in Section 3 we 
analyse the spread of human –and physical capital through China. In Section 4 we analyse the 
development of TFP, technical efficiency, and general technical development. We end with a 
brief conclusion.  
 
A new dataset on provincial human capital in China, 1922-2010 
As pointed out in the introduction, even though some growth accounting studies make use of 
average years of education in the recent decades, few studies include the value of human 
capital in their estimates and no studies make estimates of human capital by province.
2
 
Indeed, several studies on average years of education have been made for China: Barro and 
Lee (1993; 1996; 2001; 2010) reports average years of schooling for every fifth years 
beginning with 1950 in China. Likewise, Cohen and Soto (2007) do the same for every tenth 
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 There is an obvious contradiction in using standard physical capital stock data together with 
educational attainment in regression analysis. While the first is measured by value (in order to avoid 
the problem of aggregation), the latter is simply the average of years spent by formal schooling. This 
is similar as if one wanted to measure physical capital by the average number of machines in the 
economy. 
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year after 1960. Wang and Yao (2002) estimate annual series between 1952 and 1999, but, 
because of lack of data, they based their estimation on the Indian census of 1951 in 
combination with annual number of graduates by education level. Li (2009) estimates average 
years of education for several regions in China for the last few decades. Yet, long run, 
historical estimates similar to Morrisson and Murtin (2009) have not yet been made for China. 
Although Morrisson and Murtin did make one conjecture for early twentieth century China in 
their paper, they argue that since “there do not exist any satisfactory historical statistics for 
these countries [...]  , the data [...] serve only an illustrative purpose [...] and shall be taken 
with caution (p. 29). This may also have been the reason that up to date no estimates of long-
run human capital on a provincial level exist. 
 This lack of data becomes even more worrying when one seeks for a value measure of 
human capital, which is a crucial aspect in growth accounting. Only Whalley and Zhao (2010) 
calculated a human capital measure based on combining average years of education with an 
average wage rate in the population between 1979 and 2008, hence proxying for foregone 
earnings.  However, as far as we are aware, no further information on cost-or income based 
measures of human capital for China are available.  
  In this paper we therefore estimate a cost-based human capital stock for the 1922-
2010 period. We started with the method as proposed by Judson (2002). She uses the 
following equation: 
 (1) 
, where , is public expenditure on education and   is the percentage people who have 
attained level of education j in province i and year t. This results in the average educational 
expenditure in year t or the replacement value of a single year of education. Therefore, 
following Van Leeuwen and Foldvari (2008), we multiply this with average years of 
education, , to arrive at the total educational expenditure per capita in year t and 
province i, :  
 (2) 
 We thus need information on both expenditure on education by level of education as 
well as on average years of education. Starting with the latter, average years of education was 
calculated using an adapted Barro and Lee method proposed by Foldvari and Van Leeuwen 
(2009). Following Barro and Lee (2001), they started from benchmark years with census data 
on educational attainment. For the inbetween years, they calculate the attainment using an 
average of forward and backward estimates (from the preceding and following census). For 
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the data before the first, or after the last, census, we used the standard method of aggregating 
by age class and correcting for age specific mortality (e.g. Van Leeuwen and Foldvari, 
forthcoming). The data on the attainment was taken from the 1964 (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, Population Statistics Department and Ministry of Public Security, The 
Third Bureau, 1988), 1982, and 1990 (China National Bureau of Statistics 1982 and 1990 
censuses) censuses. For Taiwan we use the data from Barro and Lee (2010). The educational 
enrolment from 1907 to 2009 was taken from Li, Qi, and Qian (1995), Education Department, 
Republic of China (1934), Chinese Education Compile Committee (1946), National Statistical 
Bureau (1999), and National Bureau of Statistics of China (accessed June 2011). For Taiwan 
enrolment was taken from Chinese Education Department (1946), Mitchell (1999), and 
National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan) (accessed June 2011). Total population was 
obtained from Hou (2001), National Bureau of Statistics of China Population Statistics 
Department and Ministry of Public Security The Third Bureau (1988), and National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (accessed June 2011). For Taiwan the total population was obtained from 
Maddison (2007). The split up by age class was taken from the 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990 and 
2000 censuses (the last one obtained from National Bureau of Statistics of China, accessed 
June 2011). For the pre-war period, the split up is derived from Yin and Qi (2009). For 
Taiwan the split up by age class was obtained from Taiwan Government Statistics Office 
(1946), and Directorate - General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 
R.O.C. (Taiwan) (2010). 
Besides the data necessary to calculate average years of education, we also needed 
expenditure by level of education. These were obtained from Education Department, Republic 
of China (1934), Department of Planning Ministry of Education The People's Republic of 
China (1984), China Education Yearbook Editorial Department (1986), General Planning 
Department of Ministry of Finance (1989), Financial Department of National Education 
Committee (1990-2010), Guangxi Education Committee Financial Department (1993), Hebei 
Education Department (2009), and Society Statistics Department, National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (1994).  
 The resulting estimates on average years of education, compared with some existing 
estimates, are presented in below table. As one can see, our estimates are closest to those of 
Barro and Lee (2010) who based their estimates on census data. We do find, however, that our 
estimates are much higher in the 1960s (1960-1969) than theirs and growth slowed down 
afterwards. This seems in correspondence with total enrolment which no less than doubled in 
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the 1950s. Given that even profoundly poor people in local villages could at least attain 
around 3 years of basic education, we assume that 3.6 years of education is more  
Table 1. Average years of education in China 
  
This 
text 
Barro and 
Lee 
Morrisson and 
Murtin 
1920s 0.4 
 
ca. 1 
1930s 0.7 
  1940s 1.2 
  1950s 2.2 1.9 
 1960s 3.6 2.4 2.7 
1970s 4.4 4.0 3.5 
1980s 5.7 5.2 4.4 
1990s 6.2 6.4 5.3 
2000s 7.3 7.6 6.0 
Source: This text, Morrisson and Murtin (2009), and Barro and Lee (2010). Note: averages taken over decades. 
plausible than 2.4 in the 1960s. Also, the estimate for from Morrisson and Murtin for the 
1920s is largely a conjuncture as they also readily admit. 
Table 2.  Human –and physical capital in China and Taiwan in the 1920s and 2000s 
  
average years 
of education 
educational 
inequality 
(Gini) 
human 
capital/cap 
(1990 GK dollars) 
physical capital/cap 
(1990 GK dollars) 
GDP/cap 
(1990 GK 
dollars) 
 
1920s 
North China 0.9 86.9 15.6 NA NA 
Northeast China 0.8 82 19.2 NA NA 
Southeast China 0.3 94.3 3.4 NA NA 
Central and 
Southern China 0.3 94.7 2.2 NA NA 
Western China 0.3 94.4 2.1 NA NA 
Total China 0.4 93.5 2 NA 562.5 
Taiwan 1 86.5 NA NA 799.5 
 
2000s 
North China 8.6 15.7 16,029.9 13,691.9 8,853.9 
Northeast China 8.2 22 13,601.0 13,323.6 8,348.7 
Southeast China 7 20 11,993.1 23,227.6 9,956.6 
Central and 
Southern China 7.6 15.3 10,817.8 8,505.9 7,191.4 
Western China 6.3 24.4 6,386.3 4,946.2 4,132.4 
Total China 7.3 16.8 8,609.6 12,704.8 5,111.0 
Taiwan 10.4 20.1 34,318.1 NA 14,276.1 
 
Note: educational inequality calculated based on average years of education. For the method see Thomas, Wang 
and Fan (2000) 
Source: This text; Maddison (2007) 
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 We can also report the figures for average years of education and our cost based 
human capital measure for several regions in the 1920s and 2000 (see Table 2). We can see 
that, even though all regions experienced rapid development in both human capital and 
average years of education, North and Northeast China kept dominating. There was thus a 
strong regional persistency in human capital in China.  
 
REGIONAL SPREAD OF THE FACTORS OF PRODUCTION 
As pointed out in the introduction, many studies found TFP growth to be larger in the Eastern 
provinces. This may either be caused by the factors of production in these provinces (more 
specifically due to the omission of human capital from the growth accounting exercise which 
was more abundant in the Eastern provinces), or by higher technical efficiency in these 
provinces both of which enter as components of TFP in standard growth accounting exercises. 
Technical efficiency will be discussed in the next section, therefore we will focus our 
attention in this section on the spread of physical - and human capital in China.  
  If we look at the stock of physical capital per capita, we find that in the 1950s the per 
capita physical capital was the highest in the Northern provinces. Although the primacy of the 
North continued, also the East and some of the developing provinces, most notably  
 
 
Map 1. Physical capital per capita in 2005 (1990 GK dollars) 
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Tibet, increased their levels of physical capital considerably (see Map 1 and Table 2). This 
suggests that average growth of physical capital was considerably higher in the Eastern 
Provinces and the developing provinces than elsewhere in China. Indeed, the average annual 
growth rate of physical capital in the Eastern provinces between 1990 and 2006 was 12.5% 
versus 10.6% for the whole of China.  
 A similar pattern can be detected for human capital. Table 2 shows that already in the 
1920s the North of China was the most abundant in average years of education, a situation 
that remained that way up to the present day, even though in relative terms the gap declined. 
The same basically applies to the cost-based human capital measure. Maps 2 and 3 show the 
development of the stock of human capital over time. Also here we can see that the Eastern 
Provinces gained on the North. The big difference with physical capital, though, is that in  
  
Map 2. Cost-based human capital measure in 1925 (1990 GK dollars) 
Heilongjiang
Inner Mongol
Xinjiang
Jilin
Liaoning
Gansu
Hebei 
Beijing
Shanxi
Tianjin
Qinghai
i
Shaanxi
Ningxia
Tibet
Shandong
Henan
Jiangsu
Anhui
Sichuan Hubei
Shanghai
Chongqing Zhejiang
JiangxiHunan
Yunnan
Guizhou
Fujian
Guangxi Taiwan
Guangdong
Hainan
Ho  Kong
10.2-24.1 GK dollars
5.06-10.2 GK dollars
3.6-5.06 GK dollars
0.329-3.6 GK dollars
No data
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Map 3. Cost-based human capital measure in 2005 (1990 GK dollars) 
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terms of human capital the developing provinces did not improve as much as in physical 
capital. 
 This suggests that both human and physical capital show a large degree of regional 
persistency over time, but that especially the East benefitted in terms of the growth of both 
human-and physical capital. We can arrive at a similar conclusion using Moran’s I, a spatial 
correlation measure which measures how related values of a variable are depending on the 
place where they are measured. The results for such an analysis are reported in Table 3.  
As can be seen, there is a strong and positive spatial correlation for human- and physical 
capital and GDP/cap. This suggests that the closer two provinces are, the higher their 
correlations in terms of both physical -and human capital and per capita GDP. This is once 
again confirming our previous suggestion that regional inequalities remained persistent in 
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Table 3. Spatial correlation, Moran's I 
 
I Z p-value 
  1925 
average years of education 0.040 1.185 0.118 
cost based human capital 0.136 2.590 0.005 
K/cap NA 
  GDP/cap NA 
  
    
 
1955 
average years of education -0.048 -0.069 0.473 
cost based human capital NA 
  K/cap 0.199 3.847 0.000 
GDP/cap 0.151 2.828 0.002 
    
 
2005 
average years of education 0.207 3.515 0.000 
cost based human capital 0.108 2.163 0.015 
K/cap 0.142 2.897 0.002 
GDP/cap 0.206 3.535 0.000 
Note: one tail test 
 
China in the twentieth century while, given our previous discussion, clearly the East was 
gaining.  
 However, this finding is not true for average years of education, its spatial correlation 
being insignificant in 1925 and 1955 only to turn positive in and significant in 2005. One 
explanation, as pointed out in the introduction, is that, since average years of education may 
be considered an indicator of the volume of human rather than of its value, this suggests that 
the quantity of human capital spread through China evenly until after the Cultural Revolution 
while in terms of the value of (i.e. expenditures on) education the Northern and Eastern parts 
were in better position.  
This lack of spatial correlation in the volume, but the existence of spatial integration in 
the value of human capital can be captured empirically by estimating an error correction 
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Figure 1. Average years of education by region in China and Taiwan 
 
Note: Northeast China= Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia; Northeast China= Liaoning, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang; Southeast China= Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong; Central and 
Southern China= Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan; Western China= Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang. Tibet is excluded.  
 
model (ECM) in autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) form. Lets’ start with the 
ECM:  
( )0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1t t t t t t t t ty x y x u x y x uα α γ β β α α γ γβ γβ− − − −∆ = + ∆ + − − + = + ∆ + − − +  (3) 
Here γ is the adjustment parameter; its value is expected to be negative and shows how 
quickly the process returns to its long-run value.  α1 is the immediate effect of x on y, this 
effect is immediate and temporary (that is, it vanishes after one period). The beta coefficients 
are the elements of the cointegration vector. This is the long-run relationship between x and y 
to which the process should revert if cointegrated. The most serious econometric issue with 
such a specification is that in fixed effect dynamic panels the OLS leads to biased estimates. 
The standard solution is to use some instrumentation (or moment restrictions). The most 
popular techniques are by Arrelano and Bond (dynamic panel GMM), and Blundell and Bond 
(GMM-SYS). The main difference between the two techniques is that the second utilizes 
additional moment restrictions. Since the variables are mostly nonstationary, their first 
differences would make weak instruments in the level equation. For this reason we use the 
Arellano-Bond approach with the third lag of the log of the value of human capital (i.e. lnhc) 
variable as instrument. Since average years of education is used to create the cost based 
human capital measure we need to take care of the simultaneity problem as well: we use the 
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second lag of average years of education as additional instrument. The results of this 
regression are reported in Table 4 below.  
Table 4. Effects on human capital 
 
 Fixed effect panel Fixed effect panel  
  
OLS 
Generalized Method of Moments (one 
step) 
  coefficient t-value coefficient t-value 
LNHC(-1) -0.053 -4.979 -0.090 -1.736 
C 0.032 1.525 
  ΔLNHCWEIGHT 0.316 -1.752 0.423 8.424 
LNHCWEIGHT(-1) 0.024 2.661 0.049 1.819 
ΔAVYEARS 0.628 4.299 1.791 2.243 
AVYEARS(-1) 0.029 2.749 0.034 0.663 
ΔAVYEARSWEIGHT -0.231 -3.892 -0.740 -2.301 
AVYEARSWEIGHT(-1) -0.017 -1.470 -0.030 -1.102 
     N 750   675   
Hansen-test p-value NA 0.818 
  
The Hansen test cannot reject the null hypotheses that our instruments are indeed 
exogenous, suggesting that we have no problems with possible simultaneity. We can see that 
the short run effect of average years of education is 1.8, but that there is no long-run effect. 
That suggests that the relationship between education and human capital formation is not 
straightforward: in the short run more education may indeed increase the apparent value of 
human capital due to increased costs, but it is a quite weak policy tool to assure a stable 
growth of human capital in itself. Hence, there seems to be little correlation between the 
number of average years of education and the level of human capital.  
If we look at the effect of human capital of the neighbouring provinces we indeed find 
that both the short and long-run effects are positive and significant. This suggests that when 
the human capital in a neighbouring province is higher, the higher will be the human capital in 
this province. This suggests a strong clustering effect of expenditure on education as can be 
seen when comparing Map 2 and 3. This effect takes place in all periods and is corrected for 
province specific fixed effects. This is not strange since we already found that human capital 
per capita has a high degree of spatial consistency over time.  
It is thus clear that the Northern, and especially the Eastern, provinces were 
considerably higher in physical capital, GDP per capita, and in the quality of human capital 
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over time. This suggests that the accumulation of the factors of production as such did not 
change much over time across China. This does not mean that there was no policy change, 
however. For example, average years of education became much more equal across provinces 
over time. Only in 2005 we find a positive spatial correlation for average years of education, 
suggesting that the level of education had increased so much that in all cases an extra year of 
education went hand in hand with a significant amount of educational expenditure. We can 
also see this in Table 5 below. Here we see that until the reform period, with the exception of 
the Cultural Revolution, there is no long-run effect of average years of education on human  
Table 5. Effects on Dlnh using GMM 
  1920-1930 1950-1966 1966-1977 1978-1993 1994-2006 
LNh(t-1) -0.661 -0.529 -0.653 -0.174 -0.523 
 
(-2.52) (-7.60) (-6.45) (-4.38) (-6.18) 
Lnh(t-2) 
 
-0.071 
  
0.211 
  
(-1.05) 
  
(6.95) 
Dlnavyears(t) 3.170 0.505 0.174 0.327 0.730 
 
(2.06) (4.17) (1.68) (4.39) (3.88) 
LNavyears(t-1) 1.182 0.487 0.084 0.236 0.426 
 
(1.28) (5.98) (1.59) (4.75) (3.54) 
N  150 156 132 293 398 
Hansen test p-value  0.144 0.419 0.285 0.69 0.637 
Note: robust t-value in parentheses 
capital. Only after 1978 we find an increasingly bigger long-run effect suggesting that each 
year of extra education lead to an increase in spending on education.  
 These observations warrant the conclusion that both in physical and (cost-based) 
human capital there was a spatial persistency over time: the Northern and Eastern provinces 
had already larger stocks of human and physical capital in the 1920s and 1950s and this 
continued up to the 2000s (and probably thereafter: Wei (2008)). For human capital, the 
feature may be attributed to a stronger amount of government expenditure on education: 
irrespective of their average years of education, Eastern provinces spent more on education 
than in the West. This is a similar observation as made by Heckman (2005) who noted that the 
richer provinces spent more on education than the poorer ones. Hence, even though the 
government policy was directed at educating people across the whole of China, human capital 
as indicated by its value was strongly clustered in the North and East.  
On first sight, the finding of a higher level of both factors of production in the East (and 
North) also implies a lower efficiency of these factors of production. Yet, Li (2009, 219) 
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found that TFP growth was actually highest in the Eastern provinces. Since standard TFP 
growth includes both technical efficiency and general technical development, it is important 
to take a closer look of these factors in the next Section. 
 
TECHNOLOGY, TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
It is clear from above analysis that physical- and human capital accumulation were always 
more pronounced in the Eastern, richer, provinces. Does this mean that these provinces were 
also the ones with more “perspiration”, or did they more dependent on inspiration since the 
estimated TFP growth was higher there? And if perspiration factors in China indeed 
dominated economic growth, does this mean that we expect economic slowdown when the 
returns diminish, or is there a move over time towards general technological growth? 
In order to attempt to answer these questions, we first estimate the effect of human - 
and physical capital accumulation on economic growth in a standard growth accounting 
framework. For our analysis we start with a standard TFP analysis: 
ˆˆit t it it it
it t it it it
y A k h u
y A k h u
α β= + + +
& &&& &
(4) 
, where  is TFP growth. This standard growth accounting is given in Table 6 for 4 periods: 
1950-1966, 1966-1977 (the Cultural Revolution), 1978-1993 (the first part of the reform 
period) and 1994-2006 (the second part of the reform period). The first rows are the factor 
shares of labour and physical capital, then we have the growth of GDP per capita, human 
capital per capita, and physical capital per capita. The third to last row gives the TFP growth. 
We find that in all cases the TFP growth is negative, especially during the period 1950-1966. 
This confirms the finding of Whalley and Zhao (2010) who found a negative TFP growth for 
 
 
 
 
 
)15 
 
Table 6. Factor shares and TFP 
 
  
1950-
1966 
1966-
1977 
1978-
1993 
1994-
2006 
Factor share labour 53% 44% 54% 54% 
factor share physical 
capital 47% 56% 46% 46% 
     Growth y 2% 2% 6% 8% 
Growth hc 16% 1% 12% 15% 
Growth k 7% 5% 9% 11% 
     TFP growth -10% -1% -5% -5% 
Technical efficiency -9% -1% -7% -8% 
General technical 
growth -1% 0% 2% 3% 
     Note: Factor shares taken from Chow (1993), Li et al (1997) and, following Wang and Yao (2003) we assumed 
the factor share of labour the same for both periods of the reform period. 
Source: GDP:  National Bureau of Statistics of China (accessed June 2011), National Statistical Bureau, 1999; 
Physical capital: Wu (2003; 2009); Human capital: This text. 
 
the late 1990s. However, our study suggests that negative or insignificant TFP growth was a 
structural feature of the Chinese economy during the 20
th
 century.  
 At first sight, this seems to confirm the perspiration hypothesis: adding human capital 
to the growth accounting only lowers the effect of TFP growth. This is also what we found in 
the previous section: economic growth was strongest in those regions where also physical-and 
human capital was strongest, i.e. the North and East of China. However, TFP growth consists 
of both general technological development and technical efficiency of both human-and 
physical capital. One might, for example, argue that due to diminishing returns the technical 
efficiency of both factors of production reduce, and hence that in the Eastern provinces with 
more human and physical capital, technical efficiency is low, basically meaning that the 
effects of human-and physical capital on growth are overestimated and the role of general 
technical development in TFP is underestimated. Technical efficiency is now defined as 
difference in the output/input ratio for the factors of productions across provinces. That is, an 
additional one percentage increase in a factor of production, unlike it is usually assumed in 
TFP exercises, may have different effect on income in different provinces. Econometrically 
this phenomenon is captured by province specific coefficients.  
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 We can thus rewrite the standard TFP analysis while allowing for technical efficiency 
differences as follows: 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆˆ ˆit t it it it t it it it it iti i i i
it t it it it t it it it it it
y k h k h k h
y k h k h k h
θ ε θ ε
α β α β α α β β
θ ε θ ε
= + + + = + + + − + − +
& & & & & && && &&
 (5) 
Where θ is a time-variant common productivity factor (similar to A in the standard growth 
accounting in equation (4) but free of the effect of technical efficiency differences, and αi and 
βi are the province specific coefficients. Combining equation (4) and (5) we can show the 
relationship between TFP growth, general technology growth, and technical efficiency of 
human-and physical capital: 
 
( ) ( )ˆˆt t it iti i
t t it it
A k h
A k h
θ
α α β β
θ
= + − + −
& && &
 (6) 
 
The TFP growth in (4) is not equal to the growth rate of θ (hence, it is not equal to standard 
TFP accounting) unless: 
 
( ) ( )ˆˆ 0it iti i
it it
k h
E
k h
α α β β
 
− + − = 
 
& &
 (7) 
 
They can be equal for example if the individual coefficient is uncorrelated with the growth of 
the factor. This is very unlikely since higher human -or physical capital accumulation may 
lead to change in the coefficient (an obvious deviation from the Cobb-Douglas technology). 
Using equation (5) allows us to estimate TFP growth without the effect of technical 
efficiency, which is included with the individual coefficients of each province for physical 
and human capital (see Figure 2).  As one can see, the social returns to human- and physical 
vary a lot by province. However, there are three remarkable findings. First, there is a clear 
negative correlation between the social returns to human- and physical capital. Indeed, the 
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Figure 2. Social returns to physical and human capital by province, 1953-2006. 
 
 
social rate of returns are highly regional: in the richer areas of the Northeast, Southeast, and 
Central China the social returns to physical capital are by far the highest, while those of 
human capital are low. In the West and North of China, with much lower social returns to 
physical capital, the returns to human capital are much higher. This is remarkable, since levels 
of per capita human capital are highest in the North and lowest in the West (see Table 2), 
suggesting it has little to do with diminishing returns to capital. It seems to be clear that the 
most physical capital intensive (and less human capital intensive sectors caused the main 
growth spurts, which largely took place in the Northeast and Southwest.    
 The second interesting finding from Figure 2 is that the social returns considerably 
outperform the private returns. In Table 7 one can see that the social returns on human capital 
in China changed from ca. 23% in 1950-66 to 0% during the Cultural Revolution, 35% during 
the reform period, and 7% during the period 1994-2006. These results are relatively high 
compared to the private returns which are rather in the order of magnitude of between 4 and 
12% (Liu, 1998; Wei, Tsang, Wu, and Chen, 1999; Hossain, 1997) for the reform period, a 
period when we found social returns in the order of 35%. This corresponds well with the  
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Table 7. Effects on Dlny using GMM 
  1950-1966 1966-1977 1978-1993 1994-2006 
LNy(t-1) -0.964 -0.793 -0.993 -0.499 
 
(-6.99) (-5.33) (-4.00) (-2.01) 
Dlnh(t) 0.372 0.068 0.411 -0.016 
 
(4.14) (0.41) (4.67) (-0.22) 
LNh(t-1) 0.255 -0.226 0.343 0.085 
 
(2.97) (-1.39) (3.40) (1.64) 
DLNk(t) 1.797 1.767 1.664 1.400 
 
(4.93) (3.56) (3.08) (4.18) 
LNk(t-1) 0.017 0.383 0.159 0.274 
 
(0.16) (2.94) (1.67) (1.73) 
N 127 132 280 325 
Hansen test p-value 0.335 0.306 0.319 0.319 
     Note: robust t-values in parentheses 
 
finding of Heckman (2005) that the private returns to skills were lower than actual 
productivity. For physical capital, we find an average social return of around 50%, which is 
close to the figures reported by Heckman (2005). 
 We are now able to subtract technical efficiency from TFP growth. This is reported in 
the final two rows in Table 6. We can see that, whereas technical efficiency of human-and  
 
Figure 3. Index of common productivity factor (θ) (1953=1). 
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physical capital was continuously negative, countrywide productivity development grew over 
time from -1% in 1950-1966 to 3% in 1994-2006. The level of common productivity is 
reported in Figure 3. What is quite remarkable is that general technological development went 
clearly down in 1961 although also the previous years show a marked decline in general 
technology. This may be associated with the Great Famine, which was caused by the 
agricultural reorganisations during the Great Leap Forward. Another strong downturn took 
place during the first years of the Cultural Revolution. However, growth afterwards was clear. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In recent decades, especially with the fast growing economy, there has been much 
attention in the literature for Chinese economic development. There has been a big debate 
though if this growth is caused by capital accumulation (perspiration factors) or driven by 
TFP growth (inspiration factors). The difference between both stances is quite substantial 
since, if the perspiration theory is correct, one expects the growth of the Chinese economy to 
slow down over time as the capital accumulation grows increasingly less efficient. In many 
empirical studies, however, the relatively fast Chinese growth is explained by both physical 
capital and TFP growth. Yet, most of these studies ignore human capital.  
 In this paper we develop a new dataset on human capital for the provinces of China 
between 1922 and 2009. We find that human capital was consistently biased towards the 
North-eastern and Eastern provinces already in the 1920s.The same applies to the stock of 
physical capital, suggesting a relatively fast capital accumulation in the East.  Interestingly, 
exactly in these regions the social returns to physical capital are also high compared to the 
Western provinces. In the Western provinces, however, with much less human capital and 
physical capital, it is the social returns to human capital that are relatively high. This points at 
a very diverse economic structure in China which is mainly driven by physical capital in the 
fast growing regions in the East, and by human capital in the slower growing regions in the 
West.  
 Using our new dataset on human capital, together with physical capital and per capita 
GDP, allows us to do a TFP analysis for sub periods. We find a continuously negative TFP 
growth suggesting that reduction in productivity was a structural feature of the Chinese 
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economy. If true, this would lend support to the perspiration theory and suggest a slowdown 
of the Chinese economy in the future. However, standard growth accounting neglects 
differences in technical efficiency and leads to bias in the estimated growth rate of TFP, 
which we find to be significant in the case of China. After subtracting the effect of technical 
efficiency differences from TFP growth, we find that countrywide productivity development 
turns increasingly positive in the 1990s and 2000s. This suggests that, whereas until the 
reform period China was largely driven by capital accumulation, afterwards general technical 
development got an increasingly prominent place giving hope for continued economic 
development in the future. We still find a significant amount of technical inefficiencies across 
provinces in China however, that may undermine the efficient dissemination of new 
technologies.  
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